SEC Charged Another Defendant Treusch For Aiding Hernandez And Flagg In Their Lucrative Free-Riding Scheme
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged another Defendant Travis Treusch regarding his involvement in a multi-year "free-riding" scheme between August 2020 through January 2022 (the “Relevant Period”). The “free-riding scheme was executed by Eduardo Hernandez (“Hernandez”), Christopher Flagg (“Flagg”), Daquan Lloyd (“Lloyd”), and Corey Ortiz (“Ortiz”) between November 2018 and January 2022 at the expense of broker-dealer A (“Broker A”).
The SEC has charged Treusch for helping Hernandez and Flagg (the “Principals”) execute a sophisticated “free-riding” scheme and misappropriating “instant deposit” credits offered by Broker A and by other broker-dealers that provided similar instant credits (“Similar Brokers”) and then abandoned the accounts that received the credits.
Facts Of The SEC Charges Against Travis Treusch
1. Treusch Helps Establish Loser Accounts At Broker A
During the Relevant Period, Broker A offered a subscription service called Broker A Gold (“Gold”) to the account holders who opened trading accounts with the Broker and had a portfolio value of up to $10,000.
As per the Gold service, Broker A provided the account holders an instant deposit credit of $5,000. The instant deposit credit became available to the account holders immediately after they linked their bank accounts to their Broker A accounts and initiated a funds transfer from their linked bank accounts to their Broker A accounts.
The initiation of the funds transfer by the Broker A account holders triggered Broker A’s instant deposit credit into the account holder’s Broker A account. This allowed the account holders to trade while the transfer was pending as it took up to five business days to complete.
Furthermore, when prospects opened trading accounts with Broker A, they entered into a Customer Agreement that warranted Broker A that there were sufficient funds in the account holders’ linked bank accounts to cover the amount of the instant credit deposit offered by Broker A into their Broker A trading accounts.
The Principals solicited individuals having little trading experience (the “Recruits”) through Treusch and other Recruiters.
But first, Treusch opened a trading account at Broker A in his name to help the Principals execute the scheme. The Principals convinced Treusch that he could make “easy money” if he opened a trading account in his name at Broker A account and allowed the Principals to trade on his behalf in his Broker A trading account.
Then, the Principals directed Treusch to link his bank account to his Broker A account. Further, the Principals warned Treusch to keep no funds in his linked bank account to prevent Broker A from receiving money from the linked bank account.
Additionally, the Principals asked Treusch to provide them with his Broker A account login credentials. To do this, the Principals paid Treusch approximately $500, an amount that was a certain percentage of the profits the Principals made trading through Treusch’s trading account with Broker A.
When Treusch acted in a way as directed by the Principals, Treusch received a notice from Broker A that his trading account balance had dropped to roughly -$4,000. As a result, Broker A intended to terminate Treusch’s account.
Treusch communicated to the Principals about the notice. The Principals reassured Treusch and stated that they had discovered a “loophole” in Broker A’s systems. As a result, Broker A would eventually terminate Treusch’s trading account and everything would “blow over”.
Treusch got convinced with the Principals’s scheme. He started hiring other Recruits to open trading accounts at Broker A that Principals could use to perpetrate the scheme. Treusch further asked the Recruits he hired to link their bank accounts with their trading accounts at Broker A.
For executing the free-riding scheme, it was important for the Recruits hired by Treusch to link their bank accounts to their Broker A trading accounts to receive the instant deposit credit provided by Broker A to its Gold subscribers. Further, Treusch warned Recruits not to leave any money in their linked bank accounts.
The trading account that Treusch opened in his name and the accounts he opened via the Recruits at Broker A were called Loser Accounts. This is because these accounts were unfunded and loss-bearing. Once the Principals exhausted the instant deposit credit limit using the matched trading strategy, the Broker A trading accounts became useless as the account holders had no intention of funding their accounts.
When Broker A became aware of the insufficient funds for trading, he froze the investor accounts and eventually closed these accounts entirely.
The SEC charged a complaint against Treusch because he knew he was asking the Recruits to open Loser Accounts at Broker A since he opened one at Broker A. Furthermore, he knew the Principals intended to use the Broker A Loser Accounts as part of their trading scheme.
Thus, Treusch’s role in opening new Broker A Loser Accounts provided significant help to the Principals as it allowed them to take advantage of the instant deposit credit.
In addition to hiring Recruits to open trading accounts and linking their bank accounts with their trading accounts at Broker A, Treusch asked the Recruits to provide the login credentials of their trading accounts at Broker A. He further gave these details to the Principals.
The Principals obtained the account login information from Treusch and other Recruiters, who procured it from their Recruits, to access the trading accounts at Broker A.
Thus, Treusch and other Recruiters substantially helped Principals execute their free-riding scheme by providing them with the Recruits’ account login credentials.
After obtaining the Recruits’ trading account login credentials, the Principals gained access to the instant deposit credit of up to $5,000 on each account. Through Treusch and other Recruiters, the Principals initiated the funds transfer requests that triggered the instant deposit credit.
2. Treusch Helps Establish Winner Accounts at Other Broker-Dealers
In addition to opening Loser Accounts at Broker A, the Principals opened brokerage accounts in their names at broker-dealers other than Broker A to execute their scheme. These accounts were collectively called Winner Accounts.
To open Winner Accounts, the Principals solicited Nominees through Treusch and other Recruiters.
Nominees set up brokerage accounts in their names and gave the login credentials to the Principals so that they could directly carry out trades in the Nominees’ brokerage accounts. Using Nominees further disguised the Principals’ and Treusch’s roles in the free-riding scheme.
Treusch solicited at least two Nominees (collectively the “Treusch Nominees”) to open brokerage accounts for Hernandez to trade in. Further, Hernandez and Treusch asked each of Treusch's Nominees that Hernandez would deposit his funds into their trading accounts and use those accounts to execute profitable trades. They even stated that each Nominee would receive a percentage of the profits generated and Hernandez would receive the rest after Hernandez executed the trades. In addition, Hernandez paid Treusch a portion of the profits earned trading in the Treusch Nominee accounts.
Treusch’s Nominees had no trading experience. Further, they believed that Hernandez was a legitimate trader who would trade on their behalf using their trading accounts. As a result, both the Nominees agreed to set up accounts, provide their account login credentials, and transfer control of them to Hernandez so that he could trade in their respective accounts.
3. The Principals Engage in Matched Trading to Take Advantage of Instant Deposit Credit
The Principals began trading in the Broker A Loser Accounts within days after the Recruits’ accounts were opened and almost immediately after the instant deposit credit was available in the Loser Accounts.
Once the Principals began trading, they traded continuously until they exhausted the instant deposit credit. In most instances, the Principals began and ended trading on the same day to use the full instant deposit credit. Further, they didn’t want Broker A to know that there were insufficient funds in the linked bank accounts to fund the Broker A brokerage accounts.
Additionally, the Principals typically traded in stock options to maximize their illicit gains from the free-riding scheme.
Let’s understand how Principals generated illicit gains using stock options to carry out matched trading transactions.
Matched Trading Transaction
The Principals used highly illiquid put option contracts to maximize their earnings from the matched trading.
Illiquid options are options contracts that have very low trading activity or lack market participants willing to buy or sell them. This lack of liquidity can make it difficult for traders to enter or exit positions at desired prices.
Illiquid options typically have wider bid-ask spreads, meaning there is a significant difference between the price at which sellers are willing to sell and buyers are willing to buy.
To understand the complex trading mechanism that the Principals used to generate illicit profits, we first need to understand what are option contracts, particularly put options.
What Are Options?
An option is a derivative instrument that gives the option holder the right but not an obligation to buy or sell a specific amount of the underlying asset at a particular price (called the “Strike Price”) and within a specific period. The buyer of the option exercises his right to buy or sell the underlying asset when he earns a positive payoff by exercising his right.
Further, an investor buying an option contract needs to pay an option premium to purchase an option contract.
There are two types of option contracts: Call Option and Put Option.
Call Option
A call option is the right to buy the underlying asset at a particular strike price within a specific period.
A call option is called:
“In the Money” when its strike price is less than the spot price as it generates a positive payoff
“At the Money” when its strike price is equal to the spot price as it generates no payoff
“Out of Money” when its strike price is more than the spot price as it generates a negative payoff
The buyer of a call option gains when the call option generates a positive payoff for the buyer. Whereas, the writer (or the seller) of the call option gains to the extent of option premium when the call option buyer fails to exercise his right.
Put Option
A put option is the right to sell the underlying asset at a particular strike price at a specific future date. Such an option generates a positive payoff for the buyer when the strike price is more than the spot price, i.e., the current market price of the underlying asset.
A put option is called:
“In the Money” when its strike price is more than the spot price as it generates a positive payoff
“At the Money” when its strike price is equal to the spot price as it generates no payoff
“Out of Money” when its strike price is less than the spot price as it generates a negative payoff
The buyer of a put option gains when the put option generates a positive payoff for the buyer. The writer (or the seller) of the put option gains to the extent of option premium when the put option buyer fails to exercise his right.
Now that you know how option contracts work, let’s understand how the Principals used the matched trading strategy for highly illiquid put option contracts to generate illicit gains.
Mechanics Of Matched Trading
The Principals first selected highly illiquid put options that were deep “Out of Money”. Deep “Out of Money” options trade at low prices as they are thinly traded.
Then, the Principals ensured that the underlying assets of these put options were stocks of companies announced as merger or takeover targets. Consequently, the stocks of these companies traded in a very narrow range between the period when the merger or acquisition was announced and the deal was closed.
Next, the Principals sold these put options at highly inflated prices from the Winner Accounts they controlled to the Loser Accounts set up by the Recruits. This appeared to be an arms-length transaction, however, the Principals controlled both sides of the trade. The Principals executed these transactions by adopting the following procedure:
The Principals posted limit orders on an exchange through Winner Accounts offering to sell several contracts in a particular series of put options. A limit order is an order that allows traders to set the minimum price at which they will sell (or the maximum price for which they will buy) the options contracts.
As mentioned earlier, the put options that the Principals selected were thinly traded options and were typically “Out of Money” option contracts. Deep out-of-the-money options typically trade at very low prices because they have minimal chance of ever becoming “In the Money” or obtaining any meaningful value.
Further, the underlying securities of the put options were stocks of companies announced as merger or takeover targets. As a result, those stocks typically traded in a very narrow range between the time the deal was announced and the deal was closed.
Thus, the Principals used Winner Accounts to set the limit order at prices that were way higher than the normal market prices but within the allowed price range imposed by exchange for such option contracts. Due to options’ inflated prices, low volume, and low chance of their underlying stocks’ spot price falling enough to make these put options “In the Money”, no rational market participants would want to buy these put option contracts.
When Principals posted limit orders on an exchange through Winner Accounts offering to sell several put options contracts, at the same time, the Principals used Loser Accounts to place orders to buy the same put option series at or slightly higher than the limit price of the Winner Account’s offering to sell several contracts in a particular series of put options.
Since no market participant was willing to sell option contracts at lower prices and buy option contracts for such a high price, the exchange automatically matched the trades that the Principals placed through the Winner and Loser Accounts in a transaction. This way, the exchange filled the sell order from the Winner Account with the buy order from the Loser Account. Furthermore, the Winner Accounts received a credit for the trade.
Finally, to close these open positions, the Loser Accounts would place the order to sell the put option contracts at or near the market price. Likewise, the Winner Accounts would place the order to buy these same put option contracts at or near the market price. Since no other rational market participants would take such positions, the exchange again matched and executed the trades of the Winner Accounts and Loser Accounts.
The Principals thus profited from such a strategy in the Winner Accounts and incurred losses to the extent of the ill-gotten gains in the Loser Accounts.
4. The Principals And Treusch Deceive Broker A
The Principals and Treusch deceived and extracted money from Broker A by taking the instant deposit credit extended to the Loser Accounts at Broker A and transferring this credit to the Winner Accounts. They did this by executing matched trades between the Winner and Loser Accounts.
The Principals and Treusch intentionally deceived Broker A by soliciting and directing the Recruits to open Loser Accounts at Broker A in their names to hide the identity of the Principals and Treusch and their involvement in the trading accounts’ activity.
Further, the Principals and Treusch intentionally deceived Broker A when Treusch opened a Broker A account in his name at the Principals’ direction to conceal the Principals’ identity and involvement in Treusch’s Broker A account activity.
Charges By The Court
As per the complaint filed by the SEC on February 11, 2024, Defendant helped the Principals in violating the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder in violation of Exchange Act 20(e).
The SEC’s complaint claimed that unless Defendant is restrained, he will continue to engage in acts or practices outlined in this Complaint or acts or practices of similar type and object.
Relief Sought By The SEC
Treusch, without admitting or denying the allegations made by the SEC's complaint, has agreed to a bifurcated judgment. This judgment entails an injunction against him from violating the charged provisions and a conduct-based injunction. The duration of the conduct-based injunction and any monetary relief will be determined by the court upon motion by the SEC. However, it's important to note that this settlement is contingent upon approval by the Court.
Important Takeaways For The Investors
Considering the SEC v. Treusch case, the investors cannot deceive Brokers by opening numerous brokerage accounts through Recruits with the intent to fraudulently obtain instant deposit credit. Also, they are not allowed to open brokerage accounts with one broker to conduct losing trades and open broker accounts with other brokers to conduct winning trades essential to executing a matched trading strategy.
In case, any investor engages in any of the above-mentioned acts, they are liable to pay civil penalties, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest.