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How to take control of a Board through written consents

The Delaware Court of Chancery's ruling in Kerbawy v. McDonnell on August 19, 2015, centered on the procedure for a majority shareholder takeover of a board of directors through written consents. The case focused on the interpretation of Section 228 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. This section allows shareholders, in the absence of specific provisions in a corporation's certificate of incorporation, to execute written consents to take action that could typically occur at a shareholder meeting. These consents enable actions to be taken without a formal meeting, advance notice, or a voting process.


Kerbawy offers several important reminders and other interesting takeaways relating to Section 228, including:


  • Section 228 mandates that written consents must bear the date of each signing shareholder to be valid. To take effect, these consents, sufficient in number to enact the action, must be delivered to the corporation within sixty days of the earliest dated consent.

  • Non-controlling shareholders soliciting Board consents typically don't carry a duty of disclosure, except if derived from fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Generally, these non-controlling shareholders don't bear fiduciary duties, even if pursuing directorship. Former directors also aren't held to fiduciary duties in Delaware law.

  • Misleading disclosures influencing a majority of shareholder consents might warrant court intervention if deemed inequitable. Materiality is assessed based on whether a reasonable shareholder would find information crucial in their voting decision or if it significantly alters the overall information available.

  • Incumbent directors removed by shareholder consent face a challenge in convincing the Court to invalidate majority decisions. Breach of disclosure duty could support such action if it unjustly affects the election process.

  • Fiduciary disclosure of corporate confidential data during consent solicitation might be actionable, especially without a protective confidentiality agreement, but proving harm is necessary for a court to set aside consents equitably.

  • Section 228 allows shareholders to act independently of the Board, sans prior notice or discussion, enabling a secretive accumulation of consents to surprise the Board.

Gayatri Gupta